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NOTES
THE HUSBAND'S RECOVERY OF PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGES AFTER JUDICIAL SEPARATION
A wife judicially separated from her husband brought
suit alleging she was entitled to one-half of a workmen's com-
pensation settlement to be received by the husband for an
accident occurring prior to the judicial separation. The hus-
band claimed that she was entitled only to that portion of the
settlement which had accrued prior to the dissolution of the
community. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that when a
husband's cash settlement is received after the dissolution of
the community but is based on a "pre-dissolution, accident
related cause of action,"' and compensation is for both pre-
dissolution and post-dissolution losses, that portion of the
settlement which compensates the husband for post-
dissolution losses becomes his separate property. West v. Or-
tego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975).
Under the community property system prevailing in
Louisiana, most property acquired by either spouse during
marriage falls into the community, absent contrary stipula-
tions in a marriage contract.2 However, Louisiana Civil Code
Articles 23343 and 24024 provide that the wife's action for
1. West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242, 248 (La. 1975).
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2399: "Every marriage contracted in this State,
superinduces of right partnership or community of acquets or gains, if there
be no stipulation to the contrary."
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334: "The property of married persons is divided
into separate and common property .... [3.] The earnings of the wife when
living separate and apart from her husband, although not separated by
judgment of court, her earnings when carrying on a business, trade, occupa-
tion or industry separate from her husband, actions for damages resulting
from offenses and quasi offenses and the property purchased with all funds
thus derived, are her separate property. [4.] Actions for damages resulting
from offenses and quasi offenses suffered by the husband, living separate
and apart from his wife, by reason of fault on her part, sufficient for separa-
tion or divorce shall be his separate property. [5.] Common property is that
which is acquired by the husband and wife during marriage, in any manner
different from that above declared. .. ."
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402: "This partnership or community consists of
the profits of all the effects of which the husband has the administration and
enjoyment, either of right or in fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry
and labor of both husband and wife, and of the estate which they may acquire
during the marriage, either by donations made jointly to them both, or by
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personal injury damages is always her separate property, 5
while the husband's action is his separate property if he is
living separate and apart from his wife due to her fault. The
negative implication from these articles is that under any
other circumstances the husband's action is a community as-
set. Under the Digest of 1808, the cause of action for recovery
for personal injuries was presumably the separate property of
the injured person; 6 however, after the addition of the om-
nibus clause in 1825 to the predecessor of Article 2334, 7 the
jurisprudence held such causes of action community prop-
erty.8 Subsequent amendments to the Civil Code made the
wife's action for personal injury damages her separate prop-
erty,9 but not until 1920 was Article 2334 amended10 to recog-
purchase, or in any other similar way ..... But damages resulting from
personal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this community, but shall
always be and remain the separate property of the wife and recoverable by
herself alone; 'provided where the injuries sustained by the wife result in her
death, the right to recover damages shall be as now provided for by existing
laws.'
5. Recovery for offenses and quasi-offenses under LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334
has been construed to mean recovery for personal injuries. Rollins v.
Beaumont-Port Arthur Bus Lines, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. La. 1950);
Johnson v. Shreveport Transit Co., 137 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). It
has also been construed to mean recovery for damages to property. Peltier v.
Begovich, 239 La. 238, 118 So. 2d 395 (1960). Offenses and quasi-offenses are
treated in LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315-24.
6. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-
Matrimonial Regimes, 32 LA. L. REV. 219 (1972). The Digest did not contain
any provisions classifying damages as separate or community property. The
predecessors of LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334 were La. Digest of 1808, ch. I, arts. 13,
14. La. Digest of 1808, ch. I, art. 13: "We understand by effects proper or
heriditary [hereditary] all such as either husband and wife brings in mar-
riage or which he or she inherits or acquires during the marriage by will or
lucrative contract." La. Digest of 1808, ch. I, art. 14: "In fine we understand
by common effects or gains such as the husband and wife acquire during the
marriage by their labor, industry, purchase or any other similar way."
Nevertheless Spanish law of the time made such damages the separate prop-
erty of the injured spouse, except to the extent that recovery for medical
expenses and loss of earnings fell into the community fund. See sources cited
in Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de gananciales,
30 LA. L. REV. 1, 10 nn.65-67 (1969).
7. The "omnibus clause" commonly refers to paragraph five of LA. CIv.
CODE art. 2334: "Common property is that which is acquired by the husband
and wife during marriage, in any manner different from that above declared
8. Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900).
9. La. Acts 1902, No. 68 amended LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402 to read in part
that "damages resulting from personal injuries to the wife shall not form
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nize the husband's action for damages for personal injury as
a separate asset if it accrued while he was living apart from
his wife due to her fault. 1 Even though Article 2334 states
that the wife's "action" is her separate property, the courts
have recognized that those elements of recovery which com-
pensate for damage to community property, 12 medical ex-
penses paid with community funds, 13 or loss of the wife's
wages which accrue during the existence of the community 14
are community property.
In 1965 an apparent hiatus in the law arose when, in
Talley v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,'5 the
fourth circuit was presented with the question of the proper
division of funds when a husband, injured prior to separation,
recovered tort damages after the termination of the commun-
ity which included elements of compensation for future loss of
earnings and permanent disability. Citing no codal authority
for its solution, the court imposed an equitable division in
which the pre-dissolution wages were deemed community
property and the post-dissolution earnings separate. 16 In
1970, Alfred v. Alfred 17 followed the Talley rule of distribution,
limiting the community share of the husband's recovery to
part of this community, but shall always be and remain the separate prop-
erty of the wife and recoverable by herself alone .... La. Acts 1912, No. 70
amended Article 2334 to provide that actions for damages resulting from
offenses or quasi-offenses to the wife would remain her separate property.
10. La. Acts 1920, No. 186.
11. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV.
3, 25 (1959), explaining that the discrimination between husband and wife in
this area is a result of pressures on behalf of married women in the early
part of this century that ultimately resulted in a compromise provision with
respect to the husband.
12. Rollins v. Beaumont-Port Arthur Bus Lines, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 908
(W.D. La. 1950).
13. Id.
14. Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc., 17 So. 2d 506 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 209 La. 144, 24 So. 2d 292 (1945); Simon v. Harrison,
200 So. 476 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
15. 181 So. 2d 784 (La App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 248 La. 785, 181 So.
2d 783 (1966).
16. The trial court in Talley awarded the community damages for the loss
of earnings of the husband, for medicai and hospital expenses, and for per-
sonal injuries sustained prior to the time of the judgment of separation from
bed and board. The husband individually received damages for permanent
disability and future loss of earnings. Id. at 787.
17. 237 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 256 La. 847, 239 So.
2d 356 (1970) (apparently compromised before oral argument to the supreme
court).
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those damages accruing prior to the date the community
terminated.
A year later, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined the
nature of post-separation recovery for the husband's pre-
dissolution injury in the rather confusing decision of Cham-
bers v. Chambers.18 Although the principal opinion stated that
the wife would not be allowed to share in that portion of the
settlement which compensated the husband for earnings ac-
cruing after the effective dissolution of the community, 19 the
divided court then failed to apply the rationale it had ap-
proved, and upheld the trial court's judgment granting the
wife one-half of the entire amount involved. 20 After the opin-
ion was rendered, a per curiam 21 issued on application for
rehearing stated that the "majority" intended to hold that
the time the husband's cause of action arose determined the
nature of the entire action and whether all the funds ob-
tained were community or separate property, though the
original opinion clearly had approved, though not followed,
the Talley approach. The final disposition of the case afforded
little guidance on how lower courts should apportion the re-
covery.22
18. 259 La. 246, 249 So. 2d 896 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971).
19. Id. at 265, 249 So. 2d at 903. Chambers involved recovery under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (1908, as amended), so
technically workmen's compensation was involved, and not earnings in the
strict sense of the word.
20. Id. at 266-68, 249 So. 2d at 903-04. Under the circumstances the court
felt that it would be "virtually impossible to reconstruct exactly how much
weight was given by the negotiators to each of the items with respect to the
future pain and suffering and loss of wages," and that remand would be a
"vain and useless thing." Id. at 267-68, 249 So. 2d at 903-04. The opinion
provoked two dissents which cited the absence of express legislation requir-
ing damages collected after dissolution to fall into the community and argued
for the utilization of Article 21 to justify an equitable solution (Tate, J. and
Barham, J., dissenting). Id. at 271-76, 249 So. 2d at 905-07. Two justices
concurred, saying that as a cause of action is property acquired duiing the
marriage, the recovery should be community (Dixon, J. and Sanders, J.,
concurring). Id. at 268-71, 249 So. 2d at 904-05.
21. Id. at 276-77, 249 So. 2d at 907-08. Two dissents followed the per
curiam, arguing that the per curiam did not reflect the original opinion of the
court (Tate, J. and Barham, J., dissenting). Id. at 277-78, 249 So. 2d at 907-08.
A third justice dissented, arguing that the award for loss accruing after the
termination of the community regime should be the separate property of the
husband (Summers, J., dissenting). Id. at 278-79, 249 So. 2d at 908.
22. One circuit indicated in dicta that they understood the holding of
Chambers to be that expressed in the per curiam opinion. Aime v. Hebert, 254
1032 [Vol. 36
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted writs to clarify the Chambers opinion. 23 The court
initially inquired whether the applicable Civil Code articles
unequivocally dictate that monies received by a husband
after the dissolution of the community in settlement of claims
for personal injury occurring before dissolution fall into the
dissolved community. The court noted that although the
money settlement itself was not property acquired during the
marriage, 24 the major problem stems from the fact that the
entire cause of action, property in itself,25 accrued during the
existence of the community and should therefore be commun-
ity property in its entirety. An additional problem arises from
the procedural necessity that the husband assert all claims
for damages, including future pain and suffering and loss of
future earnings, in one action. 26 The majority attempted a
resolution by stating that paragraph five of Article 2334,27 the
provision most nearly applicable, was enacted before divorce
and industrial accidents became commonplace, so that the
legislature could not have foreseen the effect of the article. 28
Furthermore, paragraph four of Article 233429 does not
clearly state or imply that damages received by a husband
after the termination of the community as compensation for
So. 2d 299 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the problems involved
in Chambers, see Allain, Chambers v. Chambers: An Exercise in Confusion, 1
TUL. CIV. L. FORUM 1973; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1970-1971 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 32 LA. L. REV. 219 (1972); Note, 31
LA. L. REV. 425 (1971); Note, 46 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1972).
23. 325 So. 2d at 246.
24. Id. at 247. Technically, only the community is dissolved upon separa-
tion; the parties remain married until divorce. Therefore, literally, the set-
tlement was property acquired during the marriage, though not during the
existence of the community property regime. LA. CIV. CODE art. 155 provides
"The judgment of separation from bed and board carries with it the separa-
tion of goods and effects and is retroactive to the date on which the petition
for same was filed .. "
25. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 426: "An action to enforce an obligation is the
property of the obligee ......
26. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 425: "An obligee cannot divide an obligation due
him for the purpose of bringing separate actions on different portions
thereof. If he brings an action to enforce only a portion of the obligation and
does not amend his pleading to demand the enforcement of the full obligation
he shall lose his right to enforce the remaining portion."
27. See text of statute in note 3, supra.
28. 325 So. 2d at 248.
29. See text of statute in note 3, supra.
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future wage and other losses should fall into a dissolved
community. 30
In response to the wife's argument that she was entitled
to one-half of the entire recovery because Article 2334 im-
pliedly provides that the husband's entire action for damages
is a community asset, the court concluded that her contention
could succeed only "if monies derived from settlement of the
cause of action, even after dissolution of the community, are
identical with or inherently the same as a cause of action." 31
According to the court, it is equally possible that the money
acquired after dissolution "is a species of thing different from
a cause of action '32 and therefore separate by virtue of the
time of its receipt. The court apparently contemplated distin-
guishing the concept of "cause of action" from that of "recov-
ery" to such an extent that although the former may be
community property, the latter may be separate, depending
on the time of receipt. Declaring that the absence of positive
law warranted resort to Civil Code Article 21 for an equitable
solution, the court overruled Chambers and concluded that
"logic, good sense, and commendable social policy, as well as
the principles underlying the community property regim'e '33
require that post-dissolution recovery for personal injury
damages accruing after the termination of the community fall
into the husband's separate estate.
Although the result reached is admirable in terms of
fairness and equity, the court's construction of the applicable
Civil Code articles and the reasoning based upon that con-
struction are questionable. The court apparently placed much
emphasis on the time of receipt of the settlement money,
saying that because it was received after the dissolution of
the community it was not community property. One implica-
tion of the strict time of acquisition test is that in a future
situation the entire post-dissolution recovery might be held
the separate property of the husband even though it included
recovery for wages lost prior to dissolution. 34 Clearly such an
30. 325 So. 2d at 248.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 247. The court stated that these principles involve a recognition
that after the community ceases there is no longer the "reciprocal industry,
effort, and support which justifies and is the basis for the equitable fifty-fifty
system." Id. at 246.
34. The court recognizes this possibility: "We are not unmindful that a
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award would be neither proper nor equitable in many cases. 35
Furthermore, if the possibility is open to the husband to ac-
quire all the settlement funds by waiting to settle until after
dissolution, the policy favoring settlements and the expedi-
tious resolution of claims will be thwarted; if there are marital
problems a husband will likely not settle his cause of action
until the community is legally dissolved. Similarly, the court's
emphasis on the time the recovery is received mig&ht dictate
that sums received by the husband during the marriage to
compensate his pre-marital injury might be community prop-
erty, even though the "cause of action" would be his separate
property. 36
The court's rationale would also suggest that a recovery
before dissolution would be community property in its en-
tirety even though the greater portion of the funds might be
for future earnings or future pain and suffering. Yet the
court also raised the possibility that a future decision might
conclude that the portion of recovery that compensates the
husband for post-dissolution losses, although received prior to
dissolution, is his separate property. 37 Such a formulation is
logical extension of the rationale here employed might require that an entire
post-dissolution settlement be classed as the. separate property of the husband
(because it was fully acquired after dissolution)." Id. at 249. This issue was
not before the court because the husband did not appeal from that part of the
lower court judgment that awarded the wife one-half of the benefits attribut-
able to pre-dissolution losses. Id. at 249, n.17.
35. For example, should the husband suffer an accident a year or more
before the dissolution of the community but receive compensation shortly
thereafter, the wife has a valid interest in the post-dissolution funds at least
to the extent that they represent compensation for pre-dissolution loss of
earnings, that would otherwise have gone into the community, or medical
expenses that may have been paid with community funds. In the instant
case, however, only ten days were involved between the time of the accident
and the separation.
36. This situation was presented in the recent case of Broussard v.
Broussard, 326 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). The court remanded the
case to the trial court for the apportionment of damages under the principles
of West, since at the time of the trial court's decision, Chambers was control-
ling. In the case of a wife who recovers for pre-marital injury during mar-
riage, under the time of acquisition test that portion of the award that
represents post-marital loss of earnings should fall into the community.
Should the wife recover prior to marriage, it should then be separate prop-
erty brought into the marriage.
37. 325 So.2d at 249: "[Flocusing entirely upon the underlying community
property principles, one might conclude, for reasons just as compelling as
those in Chambers and in this case, that compensation in part for post-
19761 1035
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inconsistent with the court's time of acquisition test, as well
as with Articles 2334 and 2402 which apparently require in
such situations that the recovery fall into the community
regardless of the equities involved. According to the court's
rationale, an injured husband who settled during marriage at
a time when no separation was foreseeable might later be
able to claim reimbursement for that portion of the settle-
ment which represented post-dissolution losses. s
Another troublesome aspect of the case is the court's
determination that a cause of action and the subsequent re-
covery are not necessarily inseparable, but may be "inher-
ently different," the cause of action being community prop-
erty but the recovery separate. The wife's right to one-half of
the cause of action upon partition of the community3 9 be-
comes illusory if the actual award is the husband's separate
property, barring her from a share in the proceeds. 40 While
such a formulation allows the court to overcome the problems
created by the language in Article 2334 declaring that the
action is community property, the reasoning is suspect, 41 and
dissolution losses received pre-dissolution, are partially the separate prop-
erty of the husband."
38. A similar situation would be presented if prior to separation a wife
recovered damages which included future loss of earnings. Since the com-
munity during its existence would be entitled to that portion of the award
representing loss of earnings, after dissolution the wife should be entitled to
that portion of the award representing compensation for loss of earnings not
yet accrued.
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2406 provides: "The effects which compose the
partnership or community of gains, are divided into two equal portions be-
tween the husband and the wife, or between their heirs, at the dissolution of
the marriage ......
40. Under other circumstances a logical extension of the court's reason-
ing would allow the assignor or vendor of a cause of action to inform his
assignee or vendee later that since a cause of action and the recovery are
"inherently different," all that had been transferred to the latter was the
cause of action and not the right to recovery. Certainly this would be an
absurd consequence of the court's reasoning.
41. While the definition of the term "cause of action" is far from clear,
several writers feel that "recovery" is inextricably bound up in the concept
itself. Harris, What is a Cause of Action?, 16 CAL. L. REV. 459, 467 (1927):
"There seems to be no answer to the case made by Professor McCaskill that
the relief is an element of the cause of action. It is hard to conceive of a cause
of action apart from some judicial process and some relief sought."; McCas-
kill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614 (1925). Various jurispru-
dential definitions of the term indicate that relief is contemplated as a part of
the action. In Woods v. Cook, 14 Cal. App. 2d 560, 58 P.2d 965 (1936), the court
1036 [Vol. 36
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however equitable the court's decision may be in light of the
principle that a tort settlement is intended to compensate and
sustain the victim in the future, judicial reasoning may not
circumvent positive law. Therefore, it might have been overly
broad to say that there is no express law covering the subject
and that resort to Article 21 was justified.
The court intended to clarify Chambers by granting cer-
tiorari in West; perhaps a more proper and less troublesome
result could have been reached by following Justice Summers'
reasoning in his concurring opinion. From the outset the hus-
band had argued that recovery of workmen's compensation
benefits is not recovery for an "offense or quasi-offense"
within the meaning of Article 2334. While the majority felt
the argument was plausible but not entirely convincing, 42
Justice Summers argued that no "damages" are involved in
West, since workmen's compensation payments only represent
earnings and should be treated as such. 43 The workmen's
compensation system differs from the traditional personal
injury suit in two respects: first, inquiry into fault of the
employee is eliminated,44 and second, compensation payable
according to a definite schedule is substituted for damages.
The award represents a portion of the injured party's earn-
ings, not damages in the traditional sense.45 Although this
analysis would not be helpful in cases involving tort damages,
in the instant case it would have afforded an opportunity to
noted that an action is the right or power to enforce an obligation, the
obligation constituting the cause of action. "[A] person has a 'cause of action'
when he can come into court, plead and prove certain facts and secure the
relief requested ... ." Denzer v. Rouse, 48 Wis. 2d 528, 533, 180 N.W.2d 521, 524
(1970); Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 754, 168 N.W.2d 177, 179
(1969). "Cause of action means the right to sue to some substantial end. At its
core is a grievance that is judicially cognizable, in the sense that a court can
provide some remedy for it." Lewis v. Lewis, 59 Misc. 2d 525, 527, 299 N.Y.S.2d
755, 756 (1969).
42. 325 So. 2d at 248.
43. Id. at 249.
44. Recent Louisiana cases, however, have allowed recovery of damages
without fault in certain limited situations: Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441
(La. 1975); Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975); Holland v. Buckley,
305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
45. W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 53 (1936);
W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1,
32 (1951); H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PREVENTION,
INSURANCE, AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 26 (1954).
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reach the same equitable result while avoiding the difficulties
in the majority approach.
The underlying problem in cases like Chambers and West
needs legislative resolution. One solution would be to equalize
treatment of the husband and wife under the Civil Code by
making the husband's action for personal injury damages his
separate property. 46 The courts have awarded funds received
in a wife's personal injury suit to the wife for her personal
pain and suffering but have awarded damages for her loss of
earnings to the community, since those earnings would have
entered the community; similarly, the latter has been reim-
bursed for any medical expenses that may have been incur-
red.4 7 A similar apportionment of the husband's recovery for
his personal injury should work equally well. The majority of
doctrinal writers also feel that personal injury recovery
should be the separate property of the injured spouse; 4
furthermore, such recovery has always been separate under
French and Spanish law, upon which our community property
system is based. 49
46. The codal disparity between the husband and wife in this regard has
been highly criticized. Daggett, The Oklahoma Community Property Act: A
Comparative Study, 2 LA. L. REV. 575, 582 (1940); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 32 LA. L.
REV. 219, 222-23 (1972).
47. See cases cited in notes 12 and 14, supra.
48. G. MCKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY,
§§ 398, 399 (2d ed. 1925); de Funiak, Personal Injuries under the California
Community Property Law, 3 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 69, 73 (1967): "The more
reasonable view it seems to me is .. .that there may be two causes of action,
one in the injured spouse for pain, suffering, and disfigurement, which is the
separate property of that spouse, and one in the community for the loss to
the community in expenses, loss of services and the like."; The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 32
LA. L. REV. 219, 222-23 (1972).
49. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1404 (translation by Mrs. Thomas B. Pugh):
"The following are separate assets by their nature, even when they have
been acquired during marriage: clothing and linens used personally by one of
the spouses, actions for corporeal or moral damage, credits and unassignable
pensions, and generally, all of the things which have a personal character
and all of the rights which attach exclusively to the person." The present
Spanish Civil Code makes no specific provision regarding whether damages
are community or separate property. Community property is limited as fol-
lows, however: "To the conjugal partnership belong: 1. Property acquired for
a valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the commun-
ity fund whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the
spouses only; 2. Property obtained by the industry, wages, or work of the
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Of the seven other community property states, three pro-
vide that recovery by the husband or wife falls into the com-
munity,50 three consider such recovery the separate property
of the injured spouse,5 1 and the other statutory system is
unique in providing that the damages are community prop-
erty, but that upon dissolution the judge is bound to award
the damages to the injured spouse unless the funds have been
commingled or justice requires otherwise.52 In addition, the
latter system specifically provides that a settlement or judg-
ment received after separation is separate property. 53
Legislative resolution appears to be the most desirable
solution to the problems presented by cases such as Chambers
and West. Otherwise questionable interpretations of the lan-
guage and intent of the Civil Code articles will continue to
plague courts attempting to resolve such problems equitably.
Carmen Chidester Gonzalez
spouses or either of them; 3. The fruits, income, or interest collected or
accrued during the marriage derived from the partnership property, or from
that which belongs separately to either of the spouses." F. FISHER, THE CIVIL
CODE OF SPAIN WITH PHILIPPINE NOTES AND REFERENCES art. 1401 (1947).
50. Arizona, Idaho, and Washington have determined that such recovery
is community property by statutory interpretation. Delozier v. Smith, 22
Ariz. App. 136, 524 P.2d 970 (1974); Heimke v. Mufioz, 106 Ariz. 26, 470 P.2d
107 (1970); Clark v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134, 391 P.2d 853 (1964); Swager v.
Peterson, 49 Idaho 785, 291 P. 1049 (1930); Foster v. Williams, 4 Wash. App.
659, 484 P.2d 438 (1971). But cf., Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14,
539 P.2d 566 (1975) and Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1973)
(where negligent injury is inflicted upon the wife by the husband, and not a
third party, damages are not entirely community).
51. Nevada and New Mexico have established that such recovery is sepa-
rate through statutory interpretation. Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245
P.2d 826 (1952); Frederickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102
P.2d 627 (1940). Texas provides by statute that a spouse's separate property
includes recovery for personal injuries sustained during marriage, except for
any loss of earning capacity during marriage. V.T.C.A., Family Code §
5.01(a)(3) (West 1975). The jurisprudence is in accord. Smith v. Smith, 473
S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), cert. denied, 478 S.W.2d 81; Franco v.
Graham, 470 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), aff'd, Graham v. Franco, 488
S.W.2d 390 (1972).
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(c) (Deering 1976).
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126 (Deering 1976).
